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1. Introduction

On the eve of the 99th anniversary of the beginning of the mass deportations
and massacres of the Armenian people, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan offered condolences for the mass killings that occurred in Anatolia against
the Armenian population during World War I. (BBC News) He is the first Turkish
prime minister to do so. However, he never uses the word genocide to describe the
killings and continues to maintain that the deaths were part of wartime conflict. He
blames the mass murder on the predecessor to the Republic of Turkey, the Ottoman
Empire, and insists that ethnic Turks suffered as well. There are many issues with this
statement but I will focus on three. The first, and most obvious, is that Turkey still
does not recognize the Armenian genocide as such. Second, by placing the blame on
the Ottomans, he is attempting to separate the state of Turkey from the empire.
However, they aren’t two separate entities. The Republic of Turkey developed within
the Ottoman Empire and when the Empire ended and the Republic began is not an
easily defined line. While there is the official date the Republic was announced, it was
long before that Turkish nationalism began to emerge. Third is the assertion that the
massacres were wartime deaths. While they occurred during World War I, the mass
murders were part of the nationalist movement’s attempts to homogenize a region that
was ethnically and religiously heterogeneous.

Benedict Anderson defines a nation as an imagined community. (Anderson,
2006) A nation is created and a community is defined. The unifying elements of a
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nation are not inherent in a population. These elements need to be established and
must be accepted by the population, to some extent, for a nation to exist. A nation has
limits, not everyone can be part of it. Therefore, it must be established what and who
isn’t part of the nation. Dividing up populations into nation-states is a relatively
modern phenomenon. Therefore, nations had to be created. In many cases they were
created from larger empires. Empires can cover large amounts of land and encompass
many different ethnicities and religions. A group of people had to identify a
component that would unite them. This process happened all over the world and
nations were created.

The Ottoman Empire would eventually be broken apart into different nations.
How was the Ottoman Empire transformed into the Republic of Turkey?

Literature Review
The Kurdish Question in Turkey by Dogu Ergil argues, “One of the greatest
obstacles to the consolidation of democracy in Turkey has been the country’s
treatment of its Kurdish citizens.” Turkey refuses to acknowledge the presence of
minorities within its borders, as they would disrupt its created identity of a
homogenous population. Ergil argues that while an independent Turkey was being
fought for, it was put forth as a multi-cultural society; therefore, the Kurds fought with
them and supported the creation of Turkey. However, soon after the creation of the
Republic, the elites abandoned this notion in favor of a secular, western, progressive
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state. For this nationalism they needed to create the illusion of a homogenous
population. “All citizens of Turkey had to adopt a Turkish identity.” (Ergil 2000, 125)
Kurds were not discriminated against as individuals so long as they didn’t publicize
their ethnicity. Under the rule of the Ottoman Empire the Kurds were largely
autonomous. In return for their loyalty their were largely unaffected by Ottoman
policy. However, under Turkish rule, the new secular policies went against their own
values. When they rebelled the Turkish government responded by crushing the
rebellion and forcibly assimilating the Kurdish population. However, Ergil fails to
account for the Armenian genocide and deportments that had occurred nearly a decade
before. There were population policies in place to eliminate ethnic groups before
Turkey ever became a sovereign state.

Sina Akşin, a Turkish historian, wrote Turkey: From Empire to Revolutionary
Republic first in Turkish and then it was translated into English. As described in the
preface, books about 20th century Turkish history are lacking. Akşin’s book is meant
to fill that gap. While it is an improvement that the discourse about the events between
the present day and the death of Atatürk is beginning in Turkey, there is still a distance
to go. Akşin’s description of the violence against the Armenians during World War I
never labels it as genocide. Instead, he makes it sound like they forced the hand of the
Turks by murdering Turkish citizens. This theme of portraying the Turks as victims
continues throughout. He also argues that the ‘Kurdish problem’ is mostly resolved.
By rewriting history in this way Akşin reinforces the national identity the ruling elite
has worked so hard to maintain. This rewriting of history is an important tool that was
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often used to enforce Turkish nationalism.

In my thesis I will examine the concept of nationalism, specifically the process
of its creation and how that process can continue to impact state policies. I will
specifically examine the creation of the Republic of Turkey after the fall of the
Ottoman Empire. I will show that the process of the creation of Turkish nationalism
was based on homogenizing an area that was ethnically heterogeneous. The Young
Turks and their political party, the Committee of Union and Progress, subjected the
area of Anatolia to violent population policies in an attempt to create the Turkish
nation. The ways in which nationalism has dealt with ethnic minorities and the
methods utilized by the Turkish government to create Turkish nationalism from the
remains of the Ottoman Empire and its identity have been violent and based on
suppressing the identities of religious and ethnic minorities.

In my first chapter I will explore the history of the Ottoman Empire in the
decades before its collapse and how the model of subject – ruler transformed to citizen
– state. I will look at the process of change as Ottoman identity was transformed to
create Turkish identity. In my second chapter I will analyze how violent population
policies were used to shape the Turkish population and construct Turkish nationalism.
I will specifically examine the violence experienced by the Kurds, Armenians, and the
Greeks. I will also consider the continuities between the Ottoman Empire and the
Turkish Republic. In my third chapter I will examine how the politics of citizenship
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has continued the violence started in the early Republic and continued to shape
Turkish nationalism.
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2. The Ottoman Empire

At its peak the Ottoman Empire was one of the most powerful early modern
empires in the world. It was technologically and militarily advanced allowing its
leaders to create an administrative territory that spread from Africa, across the
Mediterranean, and into Asia. Constantinople, the capital city, was an economic
powerhouse and the largest urban population in Eurasia until the late 19th century.
However, the emergence of a new global dynamic of competition based on European
nation-states put pressure on the forms and strategies of a heterogeneous agrarian
Empire. From within, nationalist movements gained momentum and the empire began
losing territory. Sultan Abdülhamid II responded with reforms that built on earlier
efforts to redefine the relationship between the ruling dynasty and the population and
attempted to prevent further losses by strengthening his empire. Islam was utilized as a
unifying force for the population. However, these reforms did little to stop the loss of
territory.

Before the Ottoman Empire, Anatolia was culturally, ethnically, and
religiously diverse with no one center of power. Religiously, there were different sects
of Islam adapted to local customs, as well as multiple forms of Christianity and
Judaism. When the Ottomans came to power in the early 14th century, the rulers were
creatively able to unify these factors and to finally consolidate their rule with the
capture of Constantinople and the resulting demise of the Byzantines. “At the heart of
Ottoman success lay the ability of the royal family to hold onto the summit of power
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for over six centuries, through numerous permutations and fundamental
transformations of the state structure.” (Quataert 2005, 90) In the early years the
Sultan was the head of both the political and religious sphere. Power gradually moved
away from the sultan and toward newly emerging power factions that connected the
palace and the populace in different ways. Effort to create a more centralized
government were often figured as a ‘return’ to the past, but were increasingly about
creating a more competitive Empire in the present. Thus, reforming sultans of the 19th
century, culminating in Abdülhamid, attempted to redefine the role of the military and
the fiscal structure necessary to support it.

Role of Islam in Ottoman Identity
While the Ottoman Empire’s government and courts were based on Islamic
principles, it was accommodating towards different religions. McCarthy argues “the
Ottoman Empire was always an Islamic Empire. In such an empire Christians and
Jews were allowed to live, and even prosper, but did not take part in the running of the
state.” (McCarthy 2001, 35) Muslims were the only ones who held government
positions and were the only ones required to serve in the army. The sultan was also the
Caliph, the empire’s religious leader. “The state used the religious authorities and
courts to announce decrees and taxes and, as more generally, as instruments of
imperial control.” (Quataert 2005, 178) However, each religious community had its
own court with its own judges and legal principles, although “non-Muslims legally
were inferior to Muslims.” (Quataert 2005, 65) Each religious community was divided
into separate millets (nation), which in turn also provided religious services, schools,
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assistance to the poor, and other services. “Ethnic divisions were not considered, at
least not administratively, within millets. For example, the largest millet, the
Orthodox, included Greeks, Romanians, Serbs, Bulgarians, Arabs and others.”
(McCarthy 2001, 39) This began to change with the emergence of nationalist
movements in the 19th century.

Relationship with Europe
In the 17th century the number of foreign traders living in the major cities of
the Ottoman Empires increased, thus also increasing the economic opportunities for
Ottoman traders. England, France, the Netherlands, and Venice had established
commercial and administrative networks across the Ottoman Empire. (Goffman 2002)
In the 14th and 15th centuries a powerful Ottoman Empire was able to negotiate
Capitulations, which were reductions in customs dues and granted special privileges to
first France and then other European countries. In the early days these were beneficial
to the Ottoman economy, however, eventually they were granted to more nations and
their actions were not fully controlled by the Ottoman government. Foreigners were
now able to have their own courts and the custom dues they paid were often less than
the numbers assessed for Ottoman merchants. The increasing power of Europe meant
there was no way for the Ottomans to get rid of these privileges and the alliances
between foreign merchants and non-Muslim communities contributed to internal
fragmentation.
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The Ottoman economy was struggling and the government began to take loans
from European banks to cover their expenses. The first was in 1854 to pay for fighting
the Crimean War, however, they began borrowing money to pay for development as
well. Development never kept pace with borrowing, and soon high interest rates put
the Ottoman Empire deep in dept. European governments were happy to enforce
repayment. In 1881 the Public Debt Commission was created and run by Europeans to
take proceeds from taxes. This loss of revenue made it even more difficult for the
Ottomans to finance their reforms.

In Europe, imperial powers were negotiating a full transition into nation states.
Revolutions increasingly emphasized individual rights and the duty of the state to the
citizen. The relationship between citizen and state changed to include “recognition of
the individual as a political entity with rights.” (McCarthy 2001, 34) Europe was
quickly outpacing the Ottoman Empire in military and economic power, as a result of
intense competition over continental resources and shifts in social organization. In an
attempt to keep pace with European imperial powers Sultan Abdülhamid II instituted
reforms in administration, education, and communications. “It is now generally
recognized that the long reign of Abdülhamit II in many ways laid the foundations of
what became modern Turkey.” (Zürcher 2010, 274)1 However, these reforms were not
simply the Ottoman Empire succumbing to the pressures to westernize. Internal
pressures were just as significant as external ones.

Zurcher and McCarthy use the spelling Abdülhamit when referring to the sultan who ruled
from 1876-1909. I will keep their spelling when using quotes from their work; otherwise, I
will use the spelling Abdülhamid.

1
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The Long 19th Century
During the Long 19th Century the splintering of the Ottoman Empire began in
earnest. The ruling elites realized that the empire could no longer continue in its
current state.
Seldom, if ever, had the rebels sought to break out of or destroy the Ottoman
imperium. There had been revolts but, generally, these had worked within the
system, claiming as their goal the rectification of problems within the Ottoman
universe, such as the reduction of taxes or better justice. But in the nineteenth
century – in the Balkan, Anatolian, and Arab provinces alike – movements
emerged that actively sought to separate particular areas from Ottoman rule
and establish independent, sovereign states, subordinate to no higher political
authority. (Quataert 2005, 54)
Nationalist movements began demanding sovereign nations. Greece declared
independence in 1829, then in 1875 Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Wallachia, and
Moldova followed suit. In 1876 rebels in Bulgaria took a stand. With the Ottoman
army fighting in other parts of the Empire the rebels began killing Muslim villagers.
Violence increased and thousands of Muslims and Bulgarians were killed. Previously,
Britain had supported the Ottoman Empire diplomatically to maintain the balance of
power in Europe, but reports of the violence against Bulgarians, somewhat
exaggerated and ignoring Muslims deaths, turned public opinion against the Ottomans.
The Ottoman army most likely would have been able to stop the rebellion, however,
Russia decided to intervene. Russia declared war on April 24, 1877 and by early the
next year had almost reached Istanbul. Through mediation from other European
nations who wanted to prevent Russia from threatening their own interests, the
Ottomans were forced to give up land but not as much as they would have otherwise.
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However, the violence of the period meant that about 55 percent of the Muslims in
Bulgaria were forced to leave or killed. (McCarthy 2001, 48)

As they continued to lose land, the government attempted to bring all Ottoman
subjects more fully under their control instead of being led by community officials or
other intermediaries. Various reforms by the Sultans tried to make a more expansive
definition of what it meant to be Ottoman and include all religions. However, they a
experienced backlash from Muslims who now had to compete with non-Muslims for
jobs and status symbols and non-Muslims were also dissatisfied as it meant
individualized taxes as well as being subject to conscription. Instead of creating a
more universal Ottoman identity, nationalist movements continued gaining strength,
and rivalry from Europe made the situation even more precarious.

Reforms
In response to internal and external pressures various sultans, beginning with
Sultan Selim III (1787-1807), realized that the Ottoman Empire needed to centralize
and reform key imperial institutions. Following the defeat in a series of wars with
Russia, in 1792 Selim III made the first attempt to reorganize the military to more
closely resemble European armies. Partly caused by strong Muslim opposition, the
military reforms failed politically despite success on the battlefield. Selim III was
overthrown and murdered in 1807. His successor Mustafa IV reigned for less than two
years before being overthrown by rebels. His brother Mahmud (1808-1839) “was to
take the offensive against those associated with the old order, aiming to bring both
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centre and provinces back into clear subservience to sultanic wishes.” (Anscombe
2010, 167) One of the factors in Selim’s failure to reform the military was the fact that
he left the Janissary corps untouched. The Janissaries had once been a strong and
effective military force, however, by the 18th century they were poorly trained and
lacked discipline. Mahmud slowly built up the power of the army, while,
simultaneously, the populace began to turn against the Janissaries. When the
Janissaries revolted against the military reforms Mahmud systematically executed or
exiled them. The way was now free for Mahmud to institute more wide spread reforms
that would redefine the empire. “It was to be centralizing reform: the new system was
always aimed at ending local autonomy and increasing the power of the centre.”
(McCarthy 2001, 15)

The Tanzimat period began with Sultan Abdülmecid I (1839-1861). Tanzimat
means “order” and contains within it a sense of reorganization or restructuring.
Abdülmecid I intended to transform the relationship between the ruler and the subject.
“He declared that his subjects had rights to ‘life, honour, and fortune’ and that their
property was inviolate.” (McCarthy 2001, 16) The government had duties to its
subjects who had rights that weren’t just the rights guaranteed to Muslims by Islamic
law. These new political rights included the government taking control over issues of
welfare, education, laws, and public activities; all of which had previously been taken
care of through the separate millets. These reforms show the Ottoman Empire’s
attempts to modernize. While many of the changes that were made to the army and
bureaucracy were adapted from European practices, modernization efforts are not
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synonymous with westernization. The restructuring was intended to preserve the
Empire and sustain the Abode of Islam. Tanzimat reformers “planned to understand
Europe, to emulate its ways when necessary, but to remain Ottoman.” (McCarthy
2001, 20)

The second sultan of the Tanzimat period was Abdülaziz (1861-1876). His rule
brought the Ottoman Empire into deeper debt than it already was. After the revolts in
Bosnia and Bulgaria he was deposed by a military coup. The next sultan, Murat V
(1876), began the process of the creation of an Ottoman constitution but was found to
be mentally unbalanced and was replaced by his brother, Abdülhamid’s II (18761909) Abdülhamid continued the process, and a new constitution was proclaimed on
December 23rd, 1876. While the new parliament was democratically elected, not all
votes were equal and the sultan had final say over whether or not a law passed.
Despite the failings of the constitution and parliament, it was an important step in the
transformation of the Ottoman Empire to a nation. Previously the belief had been that
the sultan was the government. While this wasn’t always the case in practice, it was
not made apparent to the populace. “The radical assertion that popular will, as
expressed through elections, should be the basis of government was a most
signification change in itself.” (McCarthy 2001, 26)

Within the first few years of Sultan Abdülhamid II’s rule he was “faced first
and foremost with the necessity to rebuild a state and society shattered by the
disastrous war against Russia of 1877-1878.” (Zürcher 2010, 274) At the post-war
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negotiations the empire lost land, income, and the faith of the population. “The Treaty
of Berlin vividly illustrates the power of Europe during the last part of the nineteenth
century, able to impose its wishes on the world, drawing lines on maps and deciding
the fate of peoples and nations with seeming impunity.” (Quataert 2005, 59) Sultan
Abdülhamid II responded by attempting to centralize power in the government,
specifically the sultanate, and emphasized an Islamist identity for his Empire. When
members of parliament complained about the war and questioned the actions of the
sultan Abdülhamid “did not abolish the constitution; he simply never called a new
election for parliamentary deputies. The parliament was not to meet again for thirty
years.” (McCarthy 2001, 27) However, the creation of a constitution provided a base
for future nationalist movements to build their own attempts at democracy from.

“Abdülhamit was a follower of many of the principles of the Tanzimat –
reform of the governmental system, improving government efficiency, and
centralization of power.” (McCarthy 2001, 27) While he may not have been able to
hold the empire together “the Ottoman Empire could not have fought as well as it did
in World War I, nor the Turks won their Independence War, were telegraph lines,
roads and railroads not in place beforehand.” (McCarthy 2001, 28) During his reign
“the state built as many as 10,000 schools for its subjects, using these to provide a
modern education based on Ottoman values.” (Quataert 2005, 62) Power became more
and more centralized in the state. During this period “the central state aimed to strip
away the differences among Ottoman subjects and make all male subjects the same in
its eyes.” (Quataert 2005, 65) Religious affiliation no longer legally affected ones
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rights, at least in theory, if not always in practice. However, “the division of labor
between the fast-growing state bureaucracy (and army) composed primarily of
Muslims on the on the one hand, and the modern trade and industry sector dominated
by non-Muslims on the other” made it increasingly difficult to create a unified society.
(Zürcher 2010, 69) The disparity in wealth caused by this division of labor contributed
to religious and ethnic tensions.

However, the debt that was owed to Europe left the state financially weak.
“Before the Tanzimat, Ottoman rulers had indeed intervened in society and economy,
but on a selective, sometimes capricious, basis, not as a matter of state duty. Now the
state defined itself as the body that provided for the subject what they needed but
could not easily provide for themselves.” (McCarthy 2001, 34) The Ottoman Empire
was moving away from the ruler-subject relationship that characterizes an empire and
towards a state-citizen based system. To fulfill these promises the rulers needed
money, which they were sorely lacking.

The Young Turks
In the Ottoman Empire “loyalties and self-identification of the people, whether
Muslim, Christian or Jewish, were primarily religious.” (McCarthy 2001, 73) The
Tanzimat reforms were attempts at nation building. “Recognizing the benefits of
nationalism in organizing a state and claiming the loyalty of its people, the Tanzimat
government made attempts to create an Ottoman nationality.” (McCarthy 2001, 74)
The early forms of the nationalist movement that would eventually lead to the Young
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Turks began in the 1860s with their predecessors the Young Ottomans. The Young
Ottomans were a group of idealists who weren’t satisfied with the Tanzimat reforms.
They created Ottomanism, an “ideology aimed at the creation of an overarching
common Ottoman citizenship irrespective of religious or ethnic affiliation.” (Üngör
2011, 27) The group and their ideology ultimately failed to create a new cohesive
identity and a new alternative came to the fore. The alternative group to emerge in this
period that would ultimately gain power were the Young Turks. The Young Turks
were originally a movement focused on transforming the structures of power and
contesting the role of the Sultan. Only gradually did they turn to nationalist discourse
as a way of mobilizing popular support. This group would influence a generation that
would eventually begin promoting Turkish nationalism and a Turkish cultural
revolution. The Young Turks and other nationalist movements destabilized the empire
from within.

The Young Turks emerged first as a secret society within discontented students
who had been educated in the modern European-style schools created by the reforms
of the Tanzimat period. The movement consisted of “Muslim males, born almost
exclusively between 1875 and 1885, with an urban literate background.” (Zürcher
2010,110) Even though they were ethnically diverse, including Kurds, Albanians,
Circassians, and Turks, nearly all of them had been educated in one of the Europeanstyle colleges in the empire and worked for the state. Although they went on to
support a secular state it began as an Islamist movement. “Their collective identity
was certainly formed in opposition to non-Muslim.” (Zürcher 2010, 111) Their idea of
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modernity, however, was based on European ideals but adapted to Turkish customs.
“Nationalism was never their prime focus, however. Their focus was on developing
the Empire economically and militarily.” (McCarthy 2001, 28) They still believed the
different groups could work together within the Empire, but under republican rule with
a constitution. Their main grievance “against the Sultan was that his regime weakened
the state and failed to protect the Ottoman nation.” (Zürcher 2010, 276) While in the
beginning the Young Turks promoted Ottomanism, soon they identified with the
Muslim citizens, and then, in the final shift, only with a newly invented category of
the “Turk”. Each shift brought violent changes to the region and many lost their
property, homes, and lives as a result.

Constitutional Revolution of 1908
In 1908 the most influential Young Turk organization was the Committee of
Union and Progress (CUP). It began as an underground resistance network and was
more nationalist and centrist than the other group in the Young Turks. In July the CUP
revolted and forced the Sultan to reinstate the parliament and restore the constitution.
Nine months later they deposed the Sultan completely. The most pressing concern for
the new parliament was how to modernize the empire efficiently and quickly and
enable it to join the other leading nations of the world. Their goal was to create a
centralized modern state. “What the Committee of Union and Progress wanted to do
was to create, out of a society that was divided into special compartments, a modern
state which bound all its individual members to one another around a shared identity
that was to be based on the principle of universal equality.” (Akçam 2004, 127)
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Formally each religious community operated semi-autonomously and then the
Ottoman government dealt with the leaders who acted as intermediaries for each
community. The CUP wanted to create a system in which the government would
interact directly with its citizens. However, they had to find a single element that could
unify all the groups they now led. Initial efforts were linked to education reforms of
the 19th century in which all Ottoman subjects would attend the same schools, be
subject to the same laws, and everyone would speak Turkish. However, the CUP’s
hold on power was fragile.

Less than a year after the revolution opposition from conservative religious
circles led an armed insurrection on the night of April 12-13 in name of the restoration
of Islam and Islamic religious law. They were able to take over the Capital without
significant opposition from the government. Within a fortnight, troops brought in from
the provinces were able to repress the counterrevolution with relative ease but “the
fact that a revolt in the name of Islam had been able to shake the foundations of their
regime so easily and quickly came as a rude shock” to the leaders of the CUP.
(Zürcher 2010, 76) However, the revolution was not entirely religiously motivated. In
response to the Bulgarian and Macedonian nationalist movements the CUP insisted on
radical reforms that increased the focus on “Turkism”. Inevitably, the resolve in
instituting top-down reforms created discord within the ranks of the military, religious
officials, and other groups.
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World War I
In many ways World War I, July 1914 – November 1918, marked the end of an
era.
It marked the end of an old world order and led to the disappearance of four
empires. Eastern Europe was broken up into newly created nation states and
the Near East into British and French mandates that would become very
problematic nation states a generation later. World War I has left an indelible
imprint on European memory as the first industrial war, a war in which killing
itself became an industrialized process. (Zürcher 2010, 153)
As proven by the defeat in the Balkans against the Russians in 1912-1913 the
Ottoman army was nowhere near powerful enough to challenge European armies and
“no better way could be found than to put the Ottoman forces in the hands of the
Europeans themselves, who presumably knew what an army and navy should be.”
(McCarthy 2001, 95) Despite the reforms of Selim III and Mahmud II, the military
still needed to be transformed into a modern army. German officers were brought in
and reorganized the army into a much improved and a better trained fighting force.
Britain was asked to help modernize the navy and France put in charge of the
gendarmerie, however, Russia had not been asked to help due to the recent history of
animosities between the two countries. Conscription became a tool of nation building.
The Young Turks attempted to foster nationalism based on military service but the
system of exemptions prevented this. Groups who were exempt were “women; nonMuslims (formally until 1856, in practice until 1909); inhabitants of the holy places,
Mecca and Medina; religious functionaries and students in religious schools; and a
whole range of professional groups.” (Zürcher 2010, 160-161) The only people who
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saw themselves as belonging to an ‘Ottoman nation’ were a small group of Muslim
elites.

The Ottoman Empire entered the war on the side of the Central Powers on
November 5th, 1914. Russia had been slowly taking away Ottoman land since the
1770s and after they sided with Britain, Germany appeared to be only the remaining
country that could prevent further losses. Despite the improvements made to the army,
life as an Ottoman soldier during World War I was incredibly difficult. “The
conditions under which the army had to fight in wartime were atrocious. In the 1877-8
Russian war, in the Balkan War of 1912-13 and in World War I large parts of the army
were starving and many more soldiers died of cholera, typhus and dysentery than did
of wounds.” (Zürcher 2010, 160) The Ottoman soldier had essentially been fighting
for 30 years.

World War was being fought for the Ottoman Muslim. It was officially
declared a Jihad and was “partly fought out as a brutal ethnic/religious conflict in
Anatolia.” (Zürcher 2010, 148) Ottoman identity was still linked to religion and as I
will discuss in the next chapter the CUP used violence to eliminate threats to the
identity.

The war ended in 1918. Despite the Central Powers’ loss the Ottoman Empire
“survived as an empire with the revered institutions of the sultanate and caliphate
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intact.” (Zürcher 2010, 193)2 At the Paris Peace Conference the Treaty of Sevrés,
signed on August 10, 1920, split up Ottoman territory. The provisions would force the
Ottoman government to acknowledge Greek and Armenian nationalist movements and
respect their borders while simultaneously relinquishing territory to Italy. The Allies
took former provinces of the empire, especially in Greater Syria and Palestine, and
turned the Bosporus into an international zone. The winning side would effectively be
in charge of the military forces; however, the regular army would be forcibly
disbanded. In addition, an Allied Commission had control over Ottoman debt and
would oversee state budget. Essentially, they had total control over Ottoman finances
and the Capitulations were reinstated. “What remained of the Ottoman Empire was to
be independent only in name. It was to be unable to defend itself, and its finances,
transportation system and police force were to be in the hands of foreigners.”
(McCarthy 2001, 127) The government of the last Sultan, Mehmed Vahideddin,
signed the treaty and has since been branded traitors in the eyes of Turkish history. A
large segment of the population would not accept it.

The emerging nationalist movements transformed the structure of the Ottoman
Empire. As ethnic and religious tensions became more of an issue, attempts to
modernize the empire fell short. On the losing side of World War I, the changes
became even more drastic.

2

Emphasis in original.
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3. Population Policies

How does an empire transform itself into a nation? How is a population
converted from subjects to citizens? The nature of population politics was forcibly
changed in order, first to compete with a new global dynamic premised on nationstates and second to impede the fragmentation of the empire due to successful national
movements. Instead of being an Ottoman Muslim or an Ottoman Christian, one was
identified by their ethnicity, for example as Turkish, Armenian, Kurdish, etc. People
who lived side by side in the Ottoman Empire became enemies. People who had
identified as Ottoman Muslims were now labeled as Kurds, etc. In this chapter I will
examine the violence that accompanied the building of the nation-state and a clear
vision of nationalism from the Armenian genocide in World War I, through the
creation of the Republic of Turkey, and continuing to the end of the single party
period of the late 20th century.

As much as the Young Turks tried to transform the new Republic of Turkey
into a different nation from its predecessor, they still inherited many of the
bureaucratic and military systems of the Ottoman Empire. They also inherited many of
its problems. In 1923-4 “the Kemalist leadership of the Republic broke the bonds of
solidarity forged during the preceding ten years and opted for far-reaching
secularization and for Turkish (as opposed to Ottoman – Muslim) nationalism and
nation building.” (Zürcher 2010, 231) The government had to find a new identity
through which to unite the newly created state while contending with “the traumas of a
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state which lost most of its centuries-old core provinces in the spate of five years and
could survive only after massive and vicious ethnic cleansing.” (Zürcher 2010, 52)

One key characteristic of nation-building is the fabrication of an ‘other’ against
which a new unity can be constructed. The Ottoman Empire was ethnically
heterogeneous. In order to create and promote Turkish nationalism, “from 1913 to
1950, the Young Turk regime subjected East Anatolia…to various forms of nationalist
population policies aimed at ethnically homogenizing the region.” (Üngör 2011, vii)
These population policies often consisted of either forcibly removing certain ethnic
groups from the region or outright genocide.

The Armenian Genocide
The violence against the Armenians began during the reign of Abdülhamid II.
Loss of Muslim lives in the Balkans and Caucasus made Ottoman Muslims question
the loyalty of Christians living in the Empire. Hundreds of thousands of refugees
(mostly Circassians and Chechens from the Caucasus) entering the eastern provinces
adding even more tension. As the Ottoman Empire lost more and more land, Muslim
refugees came to the territory that remained. This served to further homogenize the
population and increase religious and ethnic tension. On November 1, 1895 in the
eastern province of Diyarbekir 150,000 people were massacred.

After the defeat in the Balkan wars, in 1915 the CUP turned their attention to
the non-Muslim communities. They decided that they were to blame for the defeat.
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The elite ranks of the CUP were made up of people who had lost their homeland in the
Balkans. During World War I some Armenian rebels sought aid from Russia, hoping
to be on the winning side and gain an independent Armenian nation. The Committee
of Union and Progress realized this and “the direction of policy was never in doubt:
the Armenians were to be destroyed.” (Üngör 2011, 100) Hundreds of thousands of
Armenians were killed.

In early 1915 some Armenians had already been deported. On April 24, 1915,
Armenian elites were arrested and executed. On May 23rd, the policy of deportation
was focused on practically all Armenians. Forced marches through the desert in Syria
and Iraq killed hundreds of thousands. Groups organized for that purpose killed about
one million Armenians.

The Armenian genocide is, even now, not formally recognized as genocide by
the Turkish government. This denial continues to affect Turkish policy and the place
of Armenians in the nation’s historical memory and modern governmental apparatus.
Even though the Turkish government will admit that violent acts took place, they
place the blame solely on the Ottomans. However, members of the CUP perpetrated
the genocide, which was the political party of the Young Turks. The Young Turks
then went on to establish the Republic of Turkey. As demonstrated by the massacres
during the reign of Abdülhamid, violence against the Armenian population of the
Ottoman Empire was a repeated occurrence. In part, it was a response to the
nationalist movements destabilizing the empire and the distrust of the ruling elite, both
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the Sultan and members of the CUP. Despite attempts to separate the two, without the
Ottoman Empire the Republic of Turkey would not exist in the form it is today, as I
will discuss further in the next chapter.

War of Independence
After the end of World War I, the future of the Ottoman Empire was in
jeopardy. Much of the Ottoman Empire was divided amongst the Allies. The CUP was
kicked out of the government and replaced. The new sultan, Mehmet VI, blamed the
current problems on the CUP and dedicated himself to ensuring the survival of the
Ottoman dynasty. The Armistice of Mudros signed on October 30, 1918, contained
vague provisions about Ottoman independence. In the hope that the Allies would keep
their promises the new government admitted to crimes by the CUP that hadn’t been
committed, trying to maintain the image of the ‘good Turk’, nevertheless, the Allies
quickly broke the provisions. (McCarthy 2001, 129) According to the Treaty of Sevres
because of their assistance the Greeks and the Armenians were meant to receive land.
“Despite pious pronouncements on the ‘sovereignty of peoples’ and the need for states
that reflected ethnic boundaries, the Allies completely ignored the demographic
realities in Anatolia.” (McCarthy 2001, 129) If the Turks had not fought back all of the
land of the Ottoman Empire would have been divided up. “The invasion of Anatolia
by the Greeks, and corresponding occupations of the east by the Armenians and south
by the French, galvanized and unified the Turks in a way that had never been possible
before.” (McCarthy 2001, 136) This determination to protect what they viewed as
their homeland strengthened Turkish nationalism and further distanced them from
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other groups that had previously existed together under Ottoman rule. The Turks had
to stand together as Turks if they were to win their independence.

Mustafa Kemal, who would later be known as Atatürk (Father of the Turks)
was born in 1881 in Salonika in the Ottoman Empire. He was educated at a private
primary school that didn’t have a strong religious focus. After primary school he
began his career in military academies. He experienced the destruction brought on by
the nationalist movements and he lost his homeland in the First Balkan War in 1912.
As a Lieutenant, Colonel Mustafa Kemal took charge of a division in 1915 during
World War I. He gained renown for defeating the Allies in Gallipoli. He was also able
to keep the army together in the retreat to Adana when the Allies took Haifa, Acre,
and Damascus in late 1917. Mustafa Kemal’s experiences at a private school and later
in Ottoman Europe showed him the benefits of a modernized Ottoman Empire. His
education “enabled to comprehend the failure of the reforms to arrest the increasingly
rancorous rivalries plaguing the empire’s major ethnic and religious groups.”
(Hanioğlu 2011, 26)

In 1919 Mustafa Kemal accomplished the near impossible task of uniting the
politicians, religious leaders, merchants, landowners, and military men towards the
issuing of a resolution, later known as the Nationalist Pact that demanded “the
integrity of all the regions inhabited by Turks be maintained, and that the Turks be
politically independent within them.” (McCarthy 2001, 137) After the democratically
elected parliament passed the National Pact the British were furious and arrested
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leading nationalist representatives. At Mustafa Kemal’s headquarters in Ankara a new
parliament was created, the Grand National Assembly, with Mustafa Kemal as its
president. In an attempt to unite Muslims under a nationalist cause Mustafa Kemal
promoted the Assembly as devoted to Islamic principles. The nationalist movement
was to be unified through religion. A Turkish identity was not as advanced as a major
goal as the nationalist movement still needed the support of other Muslim groups, such
as the Kurds. The religious sentiment also meant the movement would be united
against the non-Muslim Ottoman groups the Allies had supported.

“As politician, diplomat and commander, Mustafa Kemal fought and won a
protracted and arduous struggle on three fronts. In less than four years, he had risen
from being the rebel general of a dying empire to become supreme leader of a
resurgent nation.” (Hanioğlu 2011, 128) Finally, after much destruction and death, the
war of independence ended with the Treaty of Lausanne, signed in October 1923. The
Turks demanded independence and received it. The special rights, the Capitulations,
foreigners had been granted by the Treaty of Sevres were removed. “The new Turkey
was to be a state like other states, in charge of its own politics and laws.” (McCarthy
2001, 147) Now an independent nation, Turkish nationalism could reign supreme.
“Not only the Ottoman Empire had died in the wars, Ottoman society, with its
multiplicity of ethnic groups and religions, had died as well.” (McCarthy 2001, 148)
The new Republic of Turkey was proclaimed on October 29th, 1923 by the Turkish
parliament, the Grand National Assembly in Ankara.
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Republic of Turkey
Under Mustafa Kemal, the new nation aimed to become a modern state, with a
population joined together by a sense of patriotism. However, despite his use of
religion as a unifier during the War of Independence, this patriotism was not to be
religion based. “Mustafa Kemal and the state elite adopted policies and programs to
homogenize linguistic, historical and cultural features of the Turkish society and to
construct a ‘new national identity’.” (Kaya 2013, 72) Despite the creation of a new
state, it was the by building on the reforms made during the Ottoman period that
Mustafa Kemal was able to establish the new republic.

In the aftermath of World War I and the War of Independence Turkey was
devastated. “No other country, not even Russia in the revolution, suffered so much
loss of life, physical destruction, and dislocation of people in the wars.” (McCarthy
2001, 206) The new state needed to be rebuilt. In order to create a successful secular
state with a national identity based on ‘Turkishness’ Mustafa Kemal needed to reform
the institutions of the state. Instead of religious law, the Swiss civil code was
introduced and secular courts would enforce it. Education was now run by the state,
instead of religious institutions. Latin script was adopted and Turkish was made the
national language.

Much of the current literature emphasizes the tension between Christianity and
Islam during the process of the transformation of the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish
Republic. This dichotomy is utilized within the east vs. west, civilized vs. uncivilized
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discourse that is so prevalent. While it was a factor, it is more complicated than simply
Muslim vs. Christian. Throughout the war the Young Turks made it clear that they
were still in support of an Ottoman Empire for Muslims. “The proclamations of the
national resistance movement in Anatolia after 1918, for example, make it abundantly
clear that the movement for the continued independence and unity of Ottoman
Muslims.” (Zürcher 2010, 148) It was not until 1922 that the movement became
secular as the war for independence had been won and mass mobilization was no
longer needed.

Instead an immense effort at nation-building within the borders of the new
republic was made, based on the idea of a ‘Turkish’ nation. Although Turkish
nationalism was territorial and based on a shared Turkish language and culture
(with nationality being open to anyone willing to adopt these), a romantic
idealization of the Turkish national character, with racist elements became
more and more important in the 1930s. In practice, the adoption of Turkish
nationalism led to the forced assimilation of the 30 per cent or so of the
population, which did not have Turkish as its mother tongue. (Zürcher 2010,
149)
Religion was to become a private matter instead of an ideology on which to base the
running of the government. “Mustafa Kemal insisted that Islam was a ‘rational’
religion and adaptable to the contemporary world, but there was no attempt to turn a
‘purged’ Islam into a major constituent of the republican ideology.” (Zürcher 2010,
149)

The new republic was not completely disconnected from the Ottoman Empire
though. The political leadership “were all products of the modern educational
establishments of the empire, created by the Tanzimat reformers of the nineteenth
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century.” (Zürcher 2010, 143) They had all lived through the multiple upheavals of the
past decades. Many of them had been members of the CUP. The army that allowed
Mustafa Kemal to gain control over his country was still the army of the late empire.
Much of the Ottoman bureaucracy remained, and allowed the government to raise
taxes and conscript soldiers. Unfortunately, structural adjustments were not all that
was used to unite the new Turkish Republic. The identity of the population itself had
to be changed.

Tension in Religion
The first wave of nation building in the Ottoman Empire began in the 19th
century and was accompanied – after 1908, in particular – by massive levels of
violence. The current Turkish state is the product of this first wave of nation
building in Anatolia, and in this sense, it appears to have been founded upon it.
Despite all of the nationalist characteristics, this first wave of nation building
was actually experienced as fundamentally deriving from religious sources.
(Akçam 2004, 116 - 117)
Before the official creation of the Republic of Turkey the emphasis on a
Muslim state was much stronger as it was the “Muslim population that the regime had
to appeal to in order to legitimize their rule.” (Bayar 2013, 115) However, after the
end of the War for Independence, Mustafa Kemal’s reforms began the move toward a
secular republic. One obstacle he faced was the unification of the sultanate and the
caliphate. In November 1922, through the Grand National Assembly, Mustafa Kemal
separated them and the sultanate was abolished. The last sultan, the successor to
Abdülhamid, Mehmed VI left Istanbul and his cousin Abdülmecid II was chosen as
the new spiritual leader of Sunni Muslims. Sixteen months after the creation of the
Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal also abolished the caliphate. This move
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demonstrates the transformation of a government run on religious principles to a
secular one.

Population Exchange
Population exchange is “the forced movement of a large group of people from
one region to another by state policy or transnational authorities.” (Üngör 2011, 107)
This movement is a method of ridding a country of a group of people that are not
deemed acceptable to be citizens. An example of the continued influence of religion
on Turkish nation building is the population exchange that happened with Greece in
1923. As part of the Treaty of Lausanne Muslims living in Greece were exchanged for
Christians living in Turkey. Ethnicity did not affect who was traded. Around 1.2
million Orthodox Christians left or were not allowed to return if they had already left
Turkey and around 350,000 Muslims migrated to Turkey. (Gürsoy 2008, 95)

For the people who were transferred they were suddenly in a completely
unknown country. Many did not speak the language. Despite being of the same
religion they were still viewed as foreigners. These transfers helped further
homogenize the population, at least in terms of religion. “Whereas, before the war, 80
percent of what became Turkey consisted of Muslims, according to the 1927 census,
that number increased to around 98 percent.” (Gürsoy 2008, 99)
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The Kurds
As Sunni Muslims the Kurds were considered ‘Ottoman Muslims’.
Abdülhamid II created the Hamidiye regiment in 1891. The regiment was composed
of Kurdish tribesmen, but was difficult to control. They participated in the massacre of
Armenians in eastern Anatolia. In the war against Russia, Kurds fought in the Ottoman
military and some of the founding members of the CUP were Kurds. However, as a
Turkish identity became more influential non-Turkish Muslims were viewed with
increasing distrust. After the start of World War I the relationship between
government structures and the Kurds began to disintegrate. The CUP worried that the
Kurds were conspiring with the Russians. They also worried that Kurdish nationalism
would hinder the creation of a homogenous nation state. The refusal of the Kurds to
assimilate and adopt the Turkish language and customs was a perceived as a threat.

The Kurdish population in Eastern Anatolia experienced three waves of
deportation. The first was in 1916; in the middle of World War I. Huge groups were
relocated. Much of it occurred in winter, which thus increased the dangers of travel.
They were then settled in areas where the population didn’t want them. As many of
the Kurds had been pastoralists they were unable to support themselves in the urban
areas where they were forced to live. Although there are no reliable statistics for the
number of people who were deported, most researchers believe it was about 700,000
and up to half that number died as a result of the deportation. The first phase came to
an end with the end of World War I, however, the policy of deportation would soon
continue. Despite assurances by Mustafa Kemal that he would respect the rights of
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minorities and the new state would be a state for Kurds as well as Turks, he would
continue with the CUP’s policies of homogenization.

During the second phase of deportation in 1925 Kurds were deported from the
eastern provinces while Turks took their place. The secularization of the government
“was perceived as an eschatological intrusion into the collective identity of the Kurds,
the state, and the fraternity between Muslim groups.” (Üngör 2011, 123) The Kurds
revolted after the government refused to listen to their demands. Despite heavy
fighting within a few months the revolt was defeated. In response the Turkish
government marched on several villages and massacred all the residents, through
methods similar to the Armenian genocide a decade before. “Young Turk officers
viewed the population of the eastern provinces as inherently treacherous and antiTurkish, hence threats to security.” (Üngör 2011,130) Kurdish political elite were
arrested. The Turkish government “would cast a wide net to rid society, not only of
Kurdish intellectuals who indeed posed a threat, but of those who might do so in the
future.” (Üngör 2011, 130) The Young Turks also tightened control over the rest of
the country through increasing the length of time the country would be under martial
law, and further tightened restrictions on the press, and silenced all political
opposition. This paranoia even extended to members of the Young Turk movement.

In 1934 the third wave of deportations began. The Great Depression had hit the
fragile Turkish economy hard and the country was suffering, especially in the eastern
provinces. Again, a discourse of purifying the Turkish nation was used to justify the
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violence. The law organizing the deportations blamed the Kurdish ‘problem’ on the
failure of the Ottoman Empire to properly assimilate minorities during its long period
of supremacy. (Üngör 2011) The Turkish government would now achieve this to
“’safeguard, consolidate, and homogenize our national body’ because ‘it was time to
pursue and implement a population policy crafted by government hand to develop…in
quality and quantity, population masses suite for our national culture and modern
civilization’.” (Üngör 2011, 150) The Ottoman Empire was juxtaposed as the
backward empire whose people were saved by the creation of the Turkish Republic.
These deportations continued until the Young Turks were removed from government
in 1950.

The three waves of deportations are examples of the violent population policies
the Turkish government subjected the heterogeneous population of the Ottoman
Empire to in order to transform it into a homogenous Turkish nation state. “The
Kemalists sought to increase the relative size and power of the dominant ethnic group,
the Turks, at the expense of ethnic minorities.” (Üngör 2011, 153) While both the
Armenians and the Kurds experienced violence that was employed as population
policies the end goals were not the same. As Üngör argues, the Armenian population
suffered genocide and was to be completely eradicated from Turkey. While the
government killed the Kurdish elite, they still wanted the rest of the Kurdish
population to assimilate and become loyal Turkish citizens.
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The violence perpetrated against the minorities of the Ottoman Empire was a
top down approach to homogenize an ethnically and religiously diverse population.
The violence began in the Ottoman Empire, through World War I, and after the
creation of the Republic of Turkey. It is still affecting modern day citizenship, as I will
discuss in the next chapter.

42

4. The Republic of Turkey

The Republic of Turkey is still struggling with many of the same issues that
plagued it when it was first created. “After the Ottoman Empire, which grappled with
the forces of modernity throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
slowly dissolved, the Turkish nation-state that was erected in its place continued the
struggle into the twenty-first century.” (Göçek 2011, 13) A diverse population
challenged and still challenges the ideal of a homogenous national identity.
Continuing the practice of the founders, the government and ruling elite still attempt a
top-down approach of trying to make the population fit their ideal of national identity.
While in some areas the presence of minorities has become more accepted, they are
still not seen as full Turkish citizens. “Since the 1980s, Turkey has witnessed a clash
between the official understanding of citizenship, based on duties rather than rights,
and holding that society can only be formed under the unitary identity of ‘Turkish
citizen’, and demands for a more liberal understanding based on the prioritization of
rights over duties, and the recognition of differences within a new definition of
citizenship.” (Ince 2012, 137) The changing definition of citizenship within Turkey
has opened the way for policies of ethnic inclusion and exclusion however the
definition is far from consistent. This difficulty in following a firm definition is caused
by, in part, an unclear definition of Turkish nationalism itself. Some ethnicities could
become Turkish but many still felt like second-class citizens. How has the modern
definition of citizenship affected the experiences of ethnic minorities and their location
within Turkish nationalism? While the population policies of the early republic helped
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construct nationalism they continue to affect Turkish citizenship today in the form of
national memory. The remnants of the Ottoman Empire also continue to impact
Turkish nationalist claims despite attempts to disregard its influence in Turkish
history. Religion has also helped define modern nationalism.

In this chapter I will examine citizenship policies of exclusion and inclusion
from the inception of the Republic. I will argue that the identities of minorities are still
being excluded from the national community through the creation of history and
memory. This exclusion is a continuation of the population policies discussed in the
previous chapter. I will also look at how the suppression and selective representation
of certain historical events and the creation of national memory are being used to
enforce the national identity and further exclude minorities from being considered full
Turkish citizens.

Citizenship - Inclusion and Exclusion
“Citizenship has been defined as one’s participation, or membership, in a
common community typically understood as a political community.” (Ince 2012, 19)
Citizenship involves both practices of inclusion and exclusion. Who is granted full
rights as a citizen and who isn’t has a large influence on nationalism. “In most
countries, there are significant groups, usually marked by race, by ethnicity or
religion, which are denied full participation as citizens. Although they may have the
right to vote, social economic and cultural exclusion denies them the chance of
gaining political expression or of having any real say in the decisions that affect their
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lives.” (Ince 2012, 19) Members of minority communities are able to become
influential members of the Turkish government and ruling elite, however, only if they
give up all elements of their identity as a minority. “Turkish citizenship has, from the
beginning of the Republic, oscillated between an ethnic and a political definition of
the (Turkish) nation.” (Yegen 2009, 597)

Controlling and limiting citizenship is another method of defining nationalism.
“From the eighteenth century onwards, citizenship has been bound closely to the
institution of the nation-state and therefore in practice has acted as ‘a powerful
instrument of social closure’.” (Ince 2012, 19) “The theory and practice of citizenship
in Turkey have defined Turkishness as a category which is simultaneously open and
closed to non-Turks. When, in principle, it was open to non-Turkish Muslim
inhabitants of the country it was closed to non-Muslims.” (Yegen 2009, 13) Despite
reforms attempting to create a secular state, religion is still a major factor in
determining Turkish identity. Like the population exchange through the Treaty of
Lausanne, religion is more of an influence than ethnicity.

From 1923-1946 a single party governed the Republic of Turkey. The
Republican People’s Party “distinguished between citizenship (being a Turkish
citizen) and nationality (Turkishness) and tied citizenship rights to nationality.” (Ince
2012, 39) As discussed in the previous chapter only certain people were deemed to be
‘Turkish’ enough and were granted citizenship rights. All others were removed from
the nation through exportation or death. To decide on who could be a Turkish citizen
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the Republican People’s Party judged membership on religious, cultural, and ethnic
criteria. Different criteria were utilized at different times and in different areas.
Muslims were generally considered to be Turks while non-Muslims were non-Turks.
“One language, one culture, one ideal.” (Ince 2012, 39) Mustafa Kemal, through his
collection of ideals that came to be defined as “Kemalism” and remain directly linked
to national identity, promoted a secular state. However, these authoritarian reforms
were not completely successful in separating religion from the state, as religion
remained a major unifying element for the population.

The Democratic Party won the general elections on May 14, 1950, ending the
domination by a single party. “The definition of secularism, and of nationalism, which
is the most important part of Turkish identity and citizenship, became much more
moderate throughout the multi-party period.” (Ince 2012, 87) The free election of the
Democratic Party proved that the people had power and in many ways was a
‘bloodless revolution’ as written by Bernard Lewis. (Ince 2012, 89) However, after
improvements in their first four years in power, the DP began to ignore the people
who had elected them and lost support. After increasing authoritarian measures against
opposition parties, the military stepped in on May 27, 1960. “The first Turkish
experiment with political democracy had ended with military intervention.” (Ince
2012, 90)

In the period between 1960-1980 individual and citizenship rights were
expanded and representation of marginalized groups increased. This increase allowed

46

for “the beginning of political parties’ acceptance of the Kurdish issue, a taboo subject
since the establishment of the Republic.” (Ince 2012, 114) Secularism also became
more moderate, allowing for different religious sects to claim their constitutional
rights. Despite the increasing liberal views Muslim minorities such as Kurds and
Alevis, in practice, still continued to be seen as second-class citizens. On September
12, 1980 the government was overthrown by another military coup. Despite promises
to return power to a democratically elected government, when the turnover of power
did happen, only a few parties were allowed representatives in the elections. A revised
constitution was implemented in 1982 to replace the one from 1961. “The limitations
of rights and freedoms in the 1982 Constitution made citizens in Turkey more passive,
created a less participatory democracy, and served to depoliticise the system.” (Ince
2012, 142) Even though the Constitution guaranteed freedom of religion, religious
courses were made requirements in school, however, these were limited to the
traditions of Sunni Islam. Despite political stability from 1983 through 1993 “during
the 1980’s, the attitude of the state towards Alevi, Kurdish and non-Muslim citizens’
identity claims was not promising, as the state continued to ignore differences among
citizens.” (Ince 2012, 137)

The strong influence of the military in state affairs is consistently demonstrated
in military coups since the inception of the republic. The military safeguarded the
nation and protected Atatürk’s legacy. Any deviation from Kemalist principles was
‘corrected’ by military intervention. As with the population policies discussed in the
previous chapters, this is another example of the top-down tactics used to impose the

47

national identity on to the nation. The military officers claimed that the coup was to
protect democracy and the state. When it appeared that religion was once more
becoming a threat to Kemalist principles in 2007, the military threatened, once again,
to overthrow the government to protect the ideal of a secular state.

In the 1990’s citizenship was once again transformed. In 1996 the Islamist
Welfare Party had control of parliament and the Islamist leader Necmettin Erbakan
was made prime minister. However, a year later he and his government stepped down
due to military pressures as the military once again intervened when it seemed that
religious principles were becoming too much of an influence. The Constitutional
Court closed down the Islamist Welfare Party in 1998 “for infringing the Republic’s
principle of secularism.” (Ince 2012,139) Even though subsequent Islamist parties
claimed to be more moderate and less ideologically driven, many were shut down.

In 2002 the Justice and Development Party (AKP) was elected with Recap
Tayyip Erdoğan as prime minister. Erdoğan argued, “being Turkish means belonging
to a sub-identity encompassed by the larger supra-identity of Turkish citizenship.”
(Ince 2012, 2) This change occurred in response to the “challenge that powerful
ethnic, religious, and sectarian movements pose for the official view of Turkish
citizenship, which is based on one language, one culture, and one ideal.” (Ince 2012,
2) Minorities demanded recognition and not just policies of assimilation. “Legal
citizenship as a formal status has never been the sole marker of Turkishness in
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Turkey.” (Yegen 2009, 597) Even though they are citizens, Muslim minorities are not
recognized as being fully Turkish.

Ethnicity in National Identity
Since the population policies of the early Republic, ethnic minorities have had
few occasions to voice their demands for recognition. When the Democratic Party
came to power in 1950 its leaders spoke about moving away from Kemalist ideals of a
mono-ethnic Turkey identity, however, they never made any real attempts to follow
through. After the military coup in 1960 more political parties emerged, some of
which relied on support from ethnic minorities. In the following decades an Islamic
identity began to gain more power, and with it a tolerance, to a certain extent, for a
multi-ethnic identity. This tolerance did not always translate into changes, however.
Guerilla warfare between the PKK and the Turkish government dominated post 1980
ethnic issues. “Moreover, the use of terrorism by the PKK stigmatized any
multiculturalist reform as a concession to terrorism, making even more difficult.”
(Akturk 2012, 38) However, with the rise in power of Islamist parties, came a rise in
the tolerance of ethnic minorities. This rise in tolerance is similar to the Ottoman
identity in which ethnicity was not the determining factor. Despite this rise in
tolerance, though, there are still many issues that need to be dealt with for equal
citizenship, especially as many citizenship policies have included policies of
assimilation instead of acceptance of ethnic minorities.

49

Kurds in Modern Turkey
The ambiguity of the definition of Turkish citizenship has made it difficult for
ethnic Kurds to be considered fully Turkish. “There always has been a gap between
“Turkishness as citizenship” and “Turkishness as such.” (Yegen 2009, 597) As argued
by Mesut Yegen, Kurds are ‘prospective-Turks’. They exist both as Turkish citizens
but not Turkish. Sometimes the perception of Kurds as not being Turkish citizens
takes over and they are subjected to discriminatory citizenship policies. They are
vulnerable to the exclusionary policies of citizenship as well as occasionally have the
inclusionary aspects open to them. However, the rise of Kurdish nationalism has
become a major threat to Turkish nationalism. “Up until the last ten years,
conventional academic literature in Turkey typically rejected seeing issues regarding
the Kurds as an ethno-political problem and reduced it to either a general problem of
economic development or an issue of military security.” (Saracoglu 2014, 54)

As pointed out by Mesut Yegen, in the general population there is the
emerging belief that Kurds are no longer ‘prospective-Turks.’ Even though the official
view of the state is that Kurds can be assimilated into Turkishness, recent signs
“suggest that even the Turkish state is no longer a firm believer in the idea that the
Kurds are prospective Turks.” (Yegen 2009, 14) Kurdish nationalism was a military
threat in the 90’s and now “many Kurds seemed to have developed a very strong
consciousness of being different form the Turkish mainstream.” (Yegen 2009, 16)
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Denial of the Armenian Genocide
The Turkish government has continued to deny the Armenian genocide. 21
countries3 recognize the genocide and a number of international organizations4. The
United States continues to waver. Currently about 60,000 Armenians live in Turkey,
most in Istanbul. Since 1990 there has been a large increase in translating Armenian
works from Armenian to Turkish. The Turkish state would use this as an example to
show that tolerance within Turkey is increasing, on the other hand, Armenian scholars
dismiss “it as a feeble attempt at tokenism to divert attention from more serious
denials by the Turkish state.” (Göçek 2011, 186) Both articulate opposing viewpoints
and neither fully explains the situation. However, this is an example of the re-writing
of the past in a way to shed the best light on the present.

“The contemporary refusal by Turkish state and society to recognize the
gravity and severity of Armenian losses makes this collective violence additionally
traumatic. The official Turkish argument states that contemporaneous Armenian
revolutionary activities led to a substantial loss of Turkish lives, making the
destruction and suffering mutual.” (Göcek 2011, 212) By alleging that the Armenians
killed Turkish citizens the Turkish government can avoid blame. If that tactic doesn’t

3

Countries recognizing the Armenian genocide are Argentina, Armenia, Belgium, Canada,
Chile, Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Lebanon, Netherlands, Poland,
Russia, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, Uruguay, Vatican City, and Venezuela. (Armenian
Genocide Blog)
4

International organizations recognizing the Armenian Genocide include, the European
Parliament, the Council of Europe, World Council of Churches, Human Rights Association,
European Alliance of YMCAs, Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal, Mercosur, International
Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS), International Center for Transitional Justice, and
Ellie Wiesel Foundation for Humanity. (Armenian Genocide Blog)
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work, as Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan recently did as described in the
introduction, the blame can be passed off to the Ottomans. However, the denial is not
only about the Armenian genocide. “The Turkish Republic’s memory politics towards
the Armenian genocide was and is characterized by denial. But, not unlike the
genocide itself, this too was part of a larger campaign, namely to exercise all violence
from the memory of society.” (Üngör 2011, 247) As shown in the previous chapters
the Turkish Republic relied on violent tactics to enforce the national identity. Any part
of their history the Turkish government does not like, it simply takes it out of the
history books.

Religion in National Identity
Before 1922 there were still attempts to retain an Ottoman Muslim framework
as a unifying identity. After the creation of the Republic of Turkey, however, this
national identity changed direction, at least on the surface. “The agents of political
nationalism in the 1920s and 1930s were the Republican elite, who favored a topdown model of social change and imposed their secular vision of nationalism through
various means.” (Erken 2013, 172) The violence against Christians and various ethnic
groups represent the Young Turks’ attempt to create first an Ottoman Muslim nation,
and then the nation state of Turkey.

Following the war for independence Mustafa Kemal instituted reforms to
transform the Turkish state into a secular one as discussed in the previous chapter, but
many of the reforms did not manage to truly separate church from state. “Turkish state
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secularism was unable to publicly marginalize the significance of religion in Turkish
society; its nationalism was likewise unable to fully assimilate the diversity of the
populace.” (Göçek 2011, 2) However, not all Muslims could be considered Turkish.
“The politics of memory reproduced a specific perception of Islam, centered on the
distinction between “good” and “bad” Muslims, which has been at the very root of
Kemalist secularism.” (Azak 2010, 176) The Islam of the Ottoman period was not
considered true Islam. It was portrayed as time of decadence and moving away from
the true principles of Islam. In this evolving Turkish discourse certain followers of
Islam in Turkey were then shown as good Muslims.

Currently the Turkish population is nearly 100 percent Sunni Muslim. The
government realizes that in order to maintain a cohesive nation, they must appeal to
the Muslim population. “The pro-Islamic AKP government and the state have replaced
the previously adversarial tones between the state and Islam with a new partnership
and dialogue.” (Turam 2007, 135) However, tension exists due to the desire to avoid
associating with what is viewed as the backwards practices of the Ottoman Empire.

Remembering the Past
The continuation of the early population policies can still be seen in the
construction of nation’s memory. While attempting to construct the ‘ideal’ Turkish
citizen the government carefully selected which events to include in the national
history. In the early days of the Republic the elite focused on those aspects of history
that allowed them to construct the narrative that the Turks were the rightful heirs to the
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Anatolian region. Much of this was pre-Islamic and the Ottoman Empire represented
only a minor element. (Erken 2013, 172) This version of history has dominated ever
since. Education has been an important way of implanting national identity. “The
current social studies texts emphasize duties more than rights; connect ancient
civilizations and the Turkish nation; emphasize similarities between Muslim countries
and Turkey.” (Ince 2012, 181)

In the beginning of the Republic “its founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk
commanded the Turkish nation not to focus on the past, but rather to concentrate on
the present with the intention of securing its future.” (Göçek 2011, 214-215. However,
despite the insistence of the creation of a new Turkey, the effects of the Ottoman
Empire still linger. The leaders of the Young Turk revolution had all been educated
under the Tanzimat reforms. Modern Turkish policies related to are religion similar to
Abdülhamid’s. “Both limited the freedom of action of the religious authorities,
integrated them further in to the state machinery and politicized them.” (Zürcher 2010,
282-283) The debate surrounding the interpretation of religion has continued through
the different regimes. “The Hamidian regime, the Young Turks, the Kemalists, and the
neo-Kemalists all employed the means at their disposal to argue the case for true
Islam: loyal to the Caliph in Abdülhamid’s case, open to science in that of the Young
Turks, private and non-political in that of the Kemalists, and nationalist with Evren.”
(Zürcher 2010, 283)
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One of Mustafa Kemal’s contributions to Turkey was a secular nationwide
education system. “Atatürk’s ambition was to educate Turkey. Education was the
means by which the country would catch up with contemporary civilization and then
go forward with it.” (Mango 2007, 157) This system was controlled by the state. It
taught the glory of Turkish origins and the failure of the Ottoman Empire. It was yet
another mechanism in which national identity could be enforced on the population.
Much of the history taught only briefly focused on the Ottoman Empire and when it
did it was negative. Instead, history was taught in a way to emphasize that Anatolia
was the true homeland of the Turks. (Ince 2012)

The day of Atatürk’s death, November 10th, is a national day of mourning.
“Although Turkish citizens unanimously agree on his role as savior of the country,
commander-in-chief of the national liberation army, and founder of the republic, they
debate the appropriateness of his reform policies that replaced Islam with a secularnationalist doctrine.” (Ökten 2007, 95) The emergence of this debate is only a recent
occurrence. The Turkish population is beginning to question their past but it is an
uphill battle.
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5. Conclusion

The population of the Ottoman Empire was comprised of different religions
and ethnicities. Despite reforms by the Sultan attempting to strengthen the Ottoman
identity, separate nationalist movements began to emerge. Soon, sovereign nations
were breaking off from the Empire. Eventually the Young Turk movement and a
Turkish identity gained control of the Anatolian region and the new nation of Turkey
emerged, although it would always be affected by its Ottoman past, no matter how
reluctant the government is to admit it.

The transformation of the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey involved
reforming the government, redefining the relationship between the population and the
ruling elite, and navigating ethnic and religious identities and how those identities
affected the national identity. Unfortunately, these processes were accompanied by the
suppression of religious and ethnic minorities, deportations, violence, and murder.
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